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Abstract
Objective. To perform a risk analysis of the cancer chemotherapy process, by comparing five different organizations. To quan-
titatively demonstrate the usefulness of centralization and information technologies, to identify residual risks that may be the
target of additional actions.
Study design. A reengineering of the process started in 1999 and was planned to be finished in 2006. The analysis was per-
formed after the centralization and at the beginning of information technologies integration.
Setting. Two thousand two hundred beds university hospital, with medical, surgical, haematological, gynaecological, geriatric,
paediatric oncological departments. Twelve thousand cancer chemotherapies each year.
Methods. According to the failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) method, the failure modes were defined and
their criticality indexes were calculated on the basis of the likelihood of occurrence, the potential severity for the patients, and
the detection probability. Criticality indexes were compared and the acceptability of residual risks was evaluated.
Results. The sum of criticality indexes of 27 identified failure modes was 3596 for the decentralized phase, 2682 for centralization,
2385 for electronic prescription, 2081 for electronic production control, and 1824 for bedside scanning (49% global reduction). The
greatest improvements concerned the risk of errors in the production protocols (by a factor of 48), followed by readability problems
during transmission (14) and product/dose errors during the production (8). Among the six criticality indexes remaining superior to
100 in the final process, two were judged to be acceptable, whereas further improvements were planned for the four others.
Conclusions. Centralization to the pharmacy was associated with a strong improvement but additional developments involving
information technologies also contributed to a major risk reduction. A cost-effect analysis confirmed the pertinence of all
developments, as the cost per gained criticality point remained stable all over the different phases.
Keywords: proactive, prospective, risk assessment, FMECA, failure mode, cost-effect analysis, cancer chemotherapy, informa-
tion technologies
Antineoplastic agents are very commonly used to treat cancer
and some other non-neoplastic diseases. These substances
can have acute effects (irritation of skin, eyes, mucous mem-
branes, nausea, and vomiting) in case of intoxication and can
also cause chronic problems, due to their mutagenic, tera-
togenic, and carcinogenic effects.
Numerous cases of errors leading to inappropriate treat-
ment, severe patient injuries or deaths are reported in the liter-
ature. Errors can occur during the three major steps of
medication process—prescribing, compounding, and adminis-
tration—and include under- and overdosing, schedule and
timing errors, wrong drugs, infusion-rate errors, wrong admin-
istration route, omission of drugs or hydration, improper
preparation of drugs, and chemotherapy given to the wrong
patient [1]. The prevalence of medication errors associated
with antineoplastic agents, as with other drug categories, is not
precisely known, but one study, based on self-reporting, esti-
mated a chemotherapy overdose error rate of 0.06%, with
13% of the responding centers having experienced at least one
case [2]. Another study, based on direct observation, meas-
ured, in a centralized setting, overall and major preparation
error rates of 0.45 and 0.19%, respectively [3].
To circumvent risks for healthcare workers and patients,
several major principles are widely applied. It is recom-
mended to centralize the preparation in the pharmacy, in class
II vertical laminar airflow cabinets or isolators, to limit the
number of persons handling antineoplastic agents and to bet-
ter protect them [4]. Some authors have also demonstrated
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the usefulness of closed transfer systems to reduce surface
contamination and recovery of antineoplastic agents in the
urine [5,6]. The most frequently cited actions to minimize the
risk of errors in the process are to improve the education of
physicians, pharmacists, and nurses, to standardize prescrip-
tions by creating template order sets, to increase the perform-
ance of dose-verification by multiplying independent checks,
and to improve patient information [7–13]. These actions
have established their interest in saving work time and reduc-
ing costs, but few studies have addressed parameters poten-
tially influencing the safety. Information technologies can
theoretically be useful to secure the whole process, but a care-
ful evaluation of their benefits and risks is needed [14]. We
have found a single published study measuring a reduction of
antineoplastic prescription errors after the introduction of a
computerized system [15].
Risk reduction in the cancer chemotherapy process should
be a major objective for all hospitals, as the consequences can
be dramatic. The best way to improve the safety is, however,
difficult to predict and to evaluate, because the incident rate is
low and therefore the measurement of error rate reduction is
hard. A study suggested the use of a prospective risk analysis
to select the most relevant actions to undertake and measured
a 23% reduction in prescription errors [16]. Although this
approach was interesting, the measurement of impact
addressed only the prescription and was based on spontane-
ous incident reporting, which is not a robust method.
To analyze reliability problems, there has been a growing
awareness that prospective risk analysis approaches used in
several high-hazard industries need to be applied to health
care. In the United States, the Joint Commission on Accredi-
tation of Health Organizations (JCAHO) has since 1 July
2001 required each accredited hospital to conduct at least one
proactive risk assessment annually [17].
Among other methods, failure modes, effects and criticality
analysis (FMECA) is a well described tool that assesses sys-
tematically a process. It identifies possible or likely errors
(‘failure mode’), and gauges what their effect will be, even
before they take place [18]. FMECA includes a quantitative
evaluation of the criticality of each failure mode. The critical-
ity indexes (or risk priority number, RPN [19]) are calculated
by multiplying three components—likelihood of occurrence,
severity, and detection—on the basis of known or estimated
data. FMECA classifies the failure modes and determines the
top critical events, which is very helpful to evaluate the
acceptability of existing risks and to prioritize actions to
improve the safety.
We started to apply FMECA in our hospital by reengineer-
ing the paediatric parenteral nutrition production, with a sig-
nificant reduction of the criticality [20]. The method has
proved to be a useful tool and we decided to apply it to other
high-risk processes, like cancer chemotherapy.
About 12000 cancer chemotherapies are administered each
year in our 2200 beds university hospital, in medical, surgical,
haematological, gynaecological, geriatric, and paediatric
departments. The production was totally centralized at the
pharmacy between 1999 and 2002 and developments invol-
ving information technologies were initiated in 2002.
The objectives of this study were to perform a comparative
risk analysis of five different process organizations, from
decentralized to centralized production, with several levels of
information technologies, to quantitatively evaluate safety
improvements provided by these developments and to identify
major residual risks that may be the target of additional actions.
Methods
The FMECA comparative risk analysis focused on five consecu-
tive process organizations, reflecting the evolution over time.
They are summarized in Table 1. Phase 1 was a totally decentral-
ized and handwritten system: drugs were reconstituted by nurses
in vertical laminar airflow cabinets in good manufacturing prac-
tice (GMP) unclassified rooms, with the help of predefined pro-
tocols only in some cases. Prescription protocols existed in some
areas. Phase 2 was a centralized and handwritten process: all
chemotherapeutic agents were produced at the pharmacy, in neg-
ative pressure isolators placed in a GMP grade C cleanroom. Pre-
scriptions, mostly structured as protocols, were transmitted by
fax and validated by pharmacists. The drugs were produced
according to a pre-established protocol, completed and double-
checked on the basis of prescription indications. The phase 3
implemented a computerized prescription based on predefined
protocols, with an automatic calculation of production protocols,
as well as direct printing of labels. The electronic tool was
developed in-house by our Medical Informatic Department and
was compatible with our electronic patients record. The phase 4
modified the production step, with the addition of an electronic
check of product identity and weighing (CATO® program, inter-
faced to our prescription tool, see http://www.cato.at). In
phases 1–3, the adequation of drug withdrawals was based on
operator’s reliability. Finally, phase 5 added an electronic control
by scanning just before the administration, to verify the concord-
ance between the drug and the patient, by the way of radiofre-
quency identification (RFID) tags placed on them and containing
the necessary information. In phases 1–4, this control was a cog-
nitive task carried out by nurses, with the help of a paper check-
list reminding them the control points. All over the study period,
physicians and nurses also significantly improved the administra-
tion of care, by developing and applying standardized operating
procedures. At the time the analysis was done, in 2004, the pro-
cess was running according to phase 2. Phase 3 was in an
advanced state of development and phases 4 and 5 were starting.
The analysis was used to quantify the improvements con-
secutive to the centralization of production to the pharmacy
(evolution from phases 1–2) and to evaluate what would be
the impact of information technologies implementation at
different levels of the process (phases 3–5). This analysis was
performed according to the methodology previously
described [20,21]:
Team definition
1. A team including four pharmacists (head of quality
assurance, head of production, head of cytostatic
reconstitution unit, and chief pharmacist) was formed
for the main part of the analysis. An oncologist and a
nurse specialized in oncology were associated for the
Risk analysis of the cancer chemotherapy process
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evaluation of prescription and administration steps,
respectively.
Failure modes definition
2. The main steps of anticancer chemotherapy process,
from the prescription to the administration, were
defined by the team.
3. A brainstorming was organized to determine the ways
the process could fail at each step. The team had to
answer the following question ‘What could possibly go
wrong with this process step?’. The discussion was syn-
thesized, and the failure modes were determined.
Criticality analysis
4. The likelihood of occurrence (incidence) for each fail-
ure mode was classified from 1 to 10, the severity of the
potential effect for the patient from 1 to 9 and the
chance to detect the failure from 1 to 9. Estimations
were obtained by consensual quotations in the team for
all failure modes, and also with the oncologist or the
specialized nurse for the prescription and administra-
tion steps, respectively. The evaluation was carried out
on the basis of explicit criteria, published elsewhere
[20,21], by taking care of being as coherent as possible
in the quotations of similar events.
5. The criticality index of each failure mode was calculated
by multiplying the frequency, effect, and detection
scores (minimum, 1; maximum, 810).
6. Results were summarized in a table comparing the criti-
cality indexes for each mode of failure in the five pro-
cess organizations.
Data analysis
7. The table of criticality indexes was analyzed by the team
to compare risks associated with the five process orga-
nizations, to quantify the gained security obtained with
the centralization and expected with further informa-
tion technologies implementation. The sum of critical-
ity indexes for the five processes were compared to
determine the global improvement in the process security
and the potential impact on patient outcome. For each
mode of failure, the evolution of the criticality was dis-
cussed and the acceptability of the residual risk was
evaluated . When it was not considered to be appropri-
ate, additional improvements were planned.
Results
Failure modes definition
The process was split into nine major steps: prescription,
transmission, validation, edition of the production protocol,
edition of labels, material preparation, production, delivery to
the ward, and administration. Twenty-seven failure modes
were determined during the brainstorming.
Criticality analysis
The criticality indexes calculated from the defined frequency,
severity, and detection scores for each of the failure modes
are described in Table 2. The sum of criticality indexes was
3596, 2682, 2385, 2081, and 1824 for phases 1–5, respectively
(Figure 1). The evolution led to criticality index reductions
of –914 (–25%) from phase 1 to 2, –297 (–11%) from phase 2
to 3, –304 (–13%) from phase 3 to 4, and –257 (–12%) from
phase 4 to 5. From phases 1 to 5, the total criticality dimin-
ished 1772 points (–49%) and the individual criticality indexes
were reduced by a mean factor of 4.4.
For 17 out of 27 failure modes, the criticality index was
smaller in the final than in the initial process, whereas the risk
remained unchanged for seven and was slightly increased for
two. A new mode of failure—error during the writing or vali-
dation of production protocol—appeared in phase 2. Phase 2
(centralization) contributed to reduce the criticality of 12 fail-
ure modes; the phase 3 of 5, the phase 4 of 2, and the phase 5
of 5. The criticality of seven failure modes was reduced twice
during the whole process of re-engineering. The number of
indexes greater than 100 diminished from 13 in the initial
Figure 1 Evolution of the total criticality indexes (CI) in the five process organizations.
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process to 12 in phase 2, 10 in phase 3, 8 in phase 4, and 6 in
final process.
The highest risks in the initial process were computed for
errors (product or dose) during the production (CI = 432),
errors in the production protocol (432), failure to detect a pre-
scription error during the validation (343), and microbial con-
tamination during production (288). In the final process, the
most critical steps were risk of extravasation (252), microbial
contamination during the administration (252), error during
the writing/validation of prescription protocol (175) and fail-
ure to detect a prescription error during the validation (175).
The greatest risk reductions between the initial and the
final processes concerned the risk of dosage errors in the pro-
duction protocol (by a factor of 48), followed by readability
problems during the transmission (by a factor of 14) and errors
(product or dose) during the production (by a factor of 8).
The two failure modes with an increased risk, as well as the
new failure mode were associated with very low to low criti-
calities (criticality indexes = 8, 24, and 63).
Data analysis
Analyzes of the global impact concluded that each process
evolution significantly increased the patient safety, by acting
on complementary steps in the process. The largest gains
were obtained by systematically formalizing the production
protocols and by adding information technologies to reduce
calculation errors and to control the production itself.
The residual risks in the final process were examined to
evaluate their acceptability. Among the six criticality indexes
remaining superior to 100, two of them—the microbial con-
tamination during the production and during the administra-
tion—were judged to be acceptable, because of the classified
environment used for the production and the strict proce-
dures in place to avoid the occurrence of such an incident. At
the opposite, the residual risks of the four others were judged
to be unacceptable and additional safety improvements were
therefore considered. To reduce the risk of error during the
writing of prescription protocols, it was suggested to add a
validation step by a second physician. This action will not
have any impact on the likelihood of occurrence but will
increase the detectability of errors. To reduce the risk of error
in the choice of protocol and to improve the capacity of phar-
macists to detect prescription errors, a modification of proto-
col organization, and classification is proposed. Finally, an
interdisciplinary project was launched to reduce the frequency
of extravasation and minimize their severity. The objectives
were to edit institutional procedures for the administration of
antineoplastic drugs and for the management of extravasa-
tions and to analyze reported incidents to start a continuous
improvement process. These three additional actions should
contribute to an additional reduction of the process criticality.
Discussion
The FMECA method confirmed a major safety improvement
associated to the re-engineering of the anticancer chemotherapy
process. A reduction of the criticality associated to most of
the failure modes was observed, with a total reduction of
nearly 50%. Even though such a process can obviously not
avoid all errors, the risk for the patient to receive a chemo-
therapy with a wrong product or dosage has markedly been
reduced. Furthermore, the analysis identified and classified
the residual risks and thereby confronted investigators with
either accepting the determined level of risk or planifying fur-
ther improvements of the process. In this analysis, the most
critical steps in the final process were considerably lower than
in the initial process.
To centralize the production of cancer chemotherapies at the
pharmacy is the most common organizational measure taken by
hospitals to protect their healthcare workers from exposure.
Our analysis demonstrated that the centralization also markedly
improves the safety for patients, especially by increasing the
detection of prescription errors (validation by a pharmacist) and
by limiting production errors (production protocols). However,
with this single process modification, some failure modes still
have a high criticality, and this should encourage institutions to
take additional measures. Our study determined a significant
reduction of the global criticality by introducing electronic
devices at the prescription, production, and administration
steps, suggesting that these technologies could play an interest-
ing complementary role to the centralization.
One of the major limitations of safety improvements is the
cost of re-engineering. Indeed, a process modification is only
worth value if the related costs are proportional to the expected
improvement and when the costs are judged to be too high, the
residual risks should be accepted. In our case, we roughly esti-
mated the development costs (transformation of production
unit, isolators purchase, and information technologies develop-
ments) for the four migration steps and calculated the average
cost by gained point of criticality. The cost was Frs. 328/point
(205 Euros/point) for the centralization, Frs. 236/point (148
Euros/point) for electronic prescribing, Frs. 164/point (103
Euros/point) for electronic guided production, and Frs. 195/
point (122 Euros/point) for bedside scanning. These results,
illustrated in Figure 2, confirmed the pertinence of all the devel-
opments, as the criticality/costs curve remained almost linear,
even with a tendency to a reduction of the price per gained
point over the evolution. Conversely, if the curve would be
exponential, with a major increase of the price per gained point,
one should renounce to further improvement and accept the
residual risks.
The major interests of FMECA are its simplicity and the
quantitative evaluation it allows by combining three comple-
mentary factors: likelihood of occurrence, severity, and
detectability. It helps identifying the top critical events, which
is very helpful to decide and prioritize actions to be taken.
Moreover, the active discussions necessary to find consensual
quotations contribute to the development of a very clear and
shared vision of the process organization, taking into account
all the different perspectives.
The major limitation of FMECA is an unavoidable part of
subjectivity in the selection of failure modes as well as the
determination of the criticality indexes. The team should be
large and multidisciplinary enough to buffer this bias. In our
Risk analysis of the cancer chemotherapy process
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study, we obtained consensual quotations between pharma-
cists, the oncologist, and the nurse, guaranteeing the best pos-
sible objectivity. Moreover, the frequency, the severity and
the ability to detect a failure mode were determined on the
basis of explicit criteria, which limits the variability. However,
it is important to note that the main goal is to classify risk
stages and to determine orders of magnitude, and therefore
the method allows for some imprecision.
In conclusion, our study confirmed a major risk reduction
by re-engineering our cancer chemotherapy process. Both the
centralization and the implementation of information tech-
nologies had significant and complementary impacts on the
global criticality, at an acceptable cost. Our work demon-
strates the usefulness of risk analysis methods in health care
processes and a more systematic use of these tools in the
future may guide and help prioritize continuous security
improvement of high-risk medical activities.
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